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Abstract 
  This paper describes four innovative farmland preservation techniques and gauges 
support through interviews of key stakeholders: program administrators, lawmakers, and 
landowners.  Four techniques were selected for assessment from approximately 30 novel 
techniques: rights of first refusal; term conservation easements; land preservation tontines; and 
agricultural conservation pension.  Rights of first refusal was the most favored, although 
respondents thought effective implementation would need targeting of land and a dedicated 
funding source.  Agricultural conservation pension was also viewed favorably, although 
considered administratively difficult to implement.  Tontines were perceived to be an interesting 
concept, but confusing, difficult to implement, and ill-defined.  Term easements were viewed 




      Beginning in the mid-1950s, concern about the loss of farmland led to the creation of 
various farmland protection policies.  Farmland preservation programs have sought to preserve a 
productive land base for the agricultural economy, to preserve the amenity values of open space 
and rural character, to slow suburban sprawl, to provide wildlife habitat, and to provide 
groundwater recharge in areas where suburban development is occurring (Bromley and Hodge 
1990; Fischel 1985; Gardner 1977; McConnell 1989; Wolfram 1981; Duke and Aull-Hyde 2002; 
Kline and Wichelns 1998).  A recent national analysis of state preservation program enabling 
legislation found that states indicate five important goals (with the first three appearing most 
frequently): food security, environmental services, protection of rural amenities, planned 
development patterns, and a healthy local economy (Hellerstein et al. 2002). 
Preserving farmland has widespread support among the public.  Stated preference and 
other valuation studies have found significant willingness to pay for land preservation (Beasley, 
Workman, and Williams 1986; Bowker and Didychuk 1994; Ready, Berger, and Blomquist 
1997; Bergstrom, Dillman, and Stoll 1985; Halstead 1984; Duke and Ilvento 2004; Johnston et 
al. 2001; Johnston et al. 2003).  Public choice research on the voting outcomes also indicates 
public support (McLeod, Worihaye, and Menkhaus 1999; Kline and Wichelns 1994).  According 
to Land Trust Alliance (2002) data, U.S. voters have continued to pass ballot initiatives to fund 
open space and farmland preservation: in 2002, $5.7 billion in conservation funding was 
authorized; in 2001, $1.7 billion; and in 2000, $7.5 billion.  Furuseth (1987) also found that 
citizens living near farmland support preservation programs. 
  Support for preservation manifests in the proliferation of techniques to retain farmland, 
notably agricultural zoning, preferential property taxation, purchase of development  
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rights/agricultural conservation easements (for simplicity, PACE), and transfer of development 
rights (TDR).  All 50 states now have some version of preferential taxation for agricultural land.  
More than 110 governmental entities have implemented TDR and PACE programs to preserve 
farmland permanently (AFT 2001a,b,c).  As of February 2001, at least 20 states preserved 
806,300 acres with agricultural land preservation programs, while local government programs 
preserved 190,839 acres (AFT 2001a,b).  Spending on preservation in both state and local 
programs equals $2.4 billion (AFT 2004).  Twenty-four states permit agricultural zoning, six 
states have implemented growth management statutes that address farmland conversion, and 
sixteen states have agricultural district laws with a variety of incentives to encourage farmers to 
participate (AFT 1997).   
  Despite these established policies, there remains a seemingly broad and vocal consensus 
lamenting that too much farmland is being converted and that new and innovative techniques are 
needed.
1  The principal reasons given, which support the call for new techniques, are that: (1) 
PACE is too expensive; (2) TDR is not effective; and (3) preferential taxation only slows the rate 
of farmland loss but does not permanently retain the land (MALPF Task Force 2001; Gardner 
1994; Lynch and Carpenter 2003; Blewett and Lane 1988; Parks and Quimio 1996; Heimlich and 
Anderson 2001).  Some argue that existing techniques are insufficient (Adelaja and Schilling 
1999), while others explicitly call for new techniques in urbanizing areas (Parks and Schorr 
1997; Diaz and Green 2001) or the use of multiple techniques (Beesley 1999; Feitshans 2003; 
Daniels and Nelson 1986; Brabec and Smith 2002).  Moreover, Daniels and Lapping (2005) 
claim that some regulatory approaches have actually exacerbated the problems preservation 
seeks to address.  Similarly, Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz (2003), Irwin (2002), and Roe, 
                                                 
1 This paper does not address the larger issue of whether farmland preservation is socially optimal or how many 
acres should be preserved.  Mulkey and Clouser (1987) provide an introduction to challenges of conceptualizing the 
efficiency of preservation.  
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Irwin, and Morrow-Jones (2004) find that preservation efforts can generate positive amenities for 
adjacent homeowners and may increase demand for housing near preserved parcels, which 
makes achieving the goals of preservation more difficult.  
The published literature finds that existing techniques are either ineffective or not very 
effective and that many do not address the goals of farmland retention (e.g., Beesley 1999).  For 
example, spillover effects and farmland fragmentation led Pfeffer and Lapping (1995, 85) to 
argue that “without strict zoning regulations farmland often becomes parcelized” and that “a 
‘checkerboard’ distribution of farmlands” occurs such that farmers cannot operate at optimal 
scales.  This suggests that a critical mass of adjacent farmland should be a goal of farmland 
preservation techniques and a rationale for prioritization for funds (Lapping 1979; Daniels and 
Lapping 2001).  Even with this as a goal, however, programs do not often achieve it (Lynch and 
Musser 2001).  Furthermore, different techniques may be needed in different areas (Beesley 
1999). 
   Given this backdrop, this paper describes and investigates support for four innovative 
preservation techniques:  (1) term conservation easements; (2) land preservation tontines; (3) 
rights of first refusal; and (4) agricultural conservation pension with PACE.  These techniques 
were selected so as to satisfy the goals of most farmland preservation legislation (Hellerstein et 
al. 2002), including the overall goals of maintaining the agricultural economy by preserving 
productive and profitable farmland, retaining open space, and limiting sprawl development 
(dealing with the population growth in a way that does not consume farmland at an excessive 
rate).  These goals have been characterized by whether they maximize the number of acres 
preserved, preserve productive farms, preserve farms most threatened by development, and 
preserve large blocks of land (Lynch and Musser 2001).  In addition, new techniques must be  
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attractive to those landowners who have not chosen to participate in the existing preservation 
programs.  
  This research deviates from previous research in several ways.  Three existing studies 
were identified that surveyed planners and/or other experts; Pfeffer and Lapping (1994) 
interviewed planners, Diaz and Green (2001) surveyed local officials, and Beesley (1999) 
surveyed, mainly, professors and planners.  Zollinger and Krannich (2001) interviewed and 
surveyed landowners about their attitudes towards preservation techniques.  In a Wyoming 
survey, Inman and McLeod (2002) estimated an empirical model explaining support for public 
versus private solutions to agricultural land-use problems and, surprisingly, found that 
landowners support public approaches when one controls for acreage owned.  This study extends 
these efforts with parallel interviews of three groups of key stakeholders—farmland owners, 
lawmakers, and program administrators.   
  Beesley (1999) found that politicians and farmers are most important in the preservation 
process, followed by government agencies and planners.  The interview approach differs from 
the studies examining public support for preservation (mentioned above) and the studies 
explaining why landowners did or did not participate in an existing farmland preservation 
program (Phipps 1983; Pitt, Phipps, and Lessley 1986; Conrad and LeBlanc 1979; Rilla and 
Sokolow 2000; Lynch and Lovell 2003), which most often used survey data and reference single, 
more-common programs.  In our study, respondents were asked baseline questions about what 
the landscape should look like, how much farmland is needed, and what preservation goals 
should be.  Then, respondents were asked specific questions about the techniques themselves. 
  Third, this research specifically examines attitudes toward new techniques, while three 
other studies focus on more traditional techniques (Pfeffer and Lapping 1994; Diaz and Green  
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2001; Beesley 1999).  Fourth, the techniques chosen for evaluation satisfy many of the goals and 
attributes identified by the demand-side, stated-preference, and other studies of farmland 
preservation.  The four innovative techniques described and assessed may offer a way to lower 
the costs of preservation activities, increase participation, and/or increase the acceptability of 
preservation techniques (and thus political feasibility) among key stakeholders. 
  This paper is organized as follows.  The four techniques are described in the second 
section.  Then, the data collection methods and interview instrument are described in the next 
section.  The fourth section presents the results of the interviews.  Likely acceptance is evaluated 
by analyzing the responses from the interviews with key stakeholders.  The section also offers 
synthetic results from the respondents.  A final section concludes. 
 
Conceptual Framework: Four Preservation Techniques 
  Duke and Lynch (2006) describe and classify 29 distinct preservation techniques in four 
types—regulatory, incentive based, participatory, and hybrid.  Regulatory techniques define 
agricultural land markets by specifying the maximum intensities of both agricultural and 
nonagricultural land uses.  Incentive-based techniques increase the costs facing landowners who 
convert agricultural land or lower the costs facing landowners who pursue socially desirable 
preservation goals.  Incentive-based techniques differ from regulatory techniques in that they do 
not alter the institutional structure of markets; they simply alter relative prices within markets.  
Participatory techniques involve the government acting as a demander (buying land fee simple) 
or supplier (selling land with an easement attached) in a land market.  Hybrid techniques 
combine the characteristics of two of the preceding types of techniques. 
  This section describes two types of participatory techniques: rights of first refusal and  
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term conservation easements.  One incentive-based technique and one hybrid technique are 
also evaluated: the land preservation tontine and the agricultural conservation pension.  
Table 1 offers a summary evaluation for the four techniques from Duke and Lynch (2006).  In 
effect, these claims provide hypotheses to be compared with data collected from landowners, 
administrators, and the lawmakers.  The results show that most of the hypotheses proposed in 
table 1 are supported by the stakeholders.  However, some were not.  For example, landowners 
did not support term easements, and administrators suggested that the agricultural conservation 
pension would be too difficult to implement.  For some techniques, it was unclear whether the 
hypotheses were supported or refuted because the subjects could not provide well-constructed 
opinions.  More details on the specific program design were needed for them to make a complete 
evaluation. 
 
Rights of First Refusal 
  Rights of first refusal (ROFR) enable agencies to match offers that agricultural 
landowners receive from developers (Malcolm, Duke, and Mackenzie 2005).  ROFR ensure that 
agencies are “at the bargaining table” whenever landowners decide to sell for development and 
allow an agency to decide whether to match the price negotiated between the developer and the 
landowner.  If the offer is matched, the agency prevents a conversion and buys the land.  Unlike 
other preservation programs, the government does not pay any money—or, only nominal sums 
for the right—until an offer has been made, the farmer has decided to sell, and conversion is 
imminent.  ROFR should be a cost-effective land preservation tool because only those parcels 
actually threatened with conversion are targeted. 
  After purchasing those parcels deemed desirable, an agency can resell the land for an  
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agricultural use with an easement attached and thus only bear the costs of the conservation 
easement.  ROFR are classified as a government-participatory technique because a state agency 
participates in an existing market for lesser rights in land (Duke and Lynch 2006) and can be 
linked to other programs.  For instance, agreeing to ROFR could be a condition for participating 
in a use value assessment program.  Or, the government could use eminent domain to obtain 
ROFR in key areas.  This technique could be voluntary or compulsory in a targeted area. 
  Developers may be opposed to this technique since they invest resources in developing 
offers.  It also could decrease the supply of land available, which will increase the price of 
developable land.  Agricultural landowners and developers also could potentially collude to 
increase the price of the land.  Implementation challenges may arise.  For example, 
administrators would need to justify the purchase of individual parcels.  Purchasing the land is 
more expensive than purchasing development rights.  Furthermore, once purchased, 
administrators would either need to sell the land with easements attached (potentially taking a 
loss) or manage the property with all the inherent staff and resources needed. 
 
Term Conservation Easements 
  Term conservation easements preserve land by allowing a government or nonprofit 
agency to pay landowners a rental fee in exchange for a negative easement, prohibiting a set of 
activities associated with development for a set period of time.  Duke and Lynch (2006) classify 
this as a governmental-participatory land preservation technique because the government acts as 
a participant in an existing market for lesser rights in land.   Agricultural landowners are familiar 
with buying and selling leases to farmland for production and conservation.  Some landowners 
who chose not to participate in PACE might be attracted to a “lease” of conservation easements  
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because it is familiar and because it is for a temporary period. 
  These leases should be less expensive (per year and for the set period) than PACE 
because there is no permanent commitment.  In this sense, term easements could be used to 
preserve, at a lower cost and temporarily, critical areas during periods when there are insufficient 
funds for higher levels of preservation.  Moreover, because participation ought to be greater 
under the shorter time frames, leases could be used in a similar fashion to moratoria to stabilize a 
particularly threatened region until a more permanent solution could be adopted.  However, 
given that some landowners do not participate in PACE because of perceived obstacles or 
insufficient payments paid, these landowners may actually need higher payments to participate in 
a term conservation lease than existing PACE participants.  
 
Land Preservation Tontines 
  An agricultural land preservation tontine is a contract that internalizes the negative 
pecuniary and technological externalities
2 that one agricultural landowner who converts imposes 
on neighboring owners remaining in agriculture.  Specifically, the tontine provides incentives for 
owners to maintain agricultural land use through: 
(1) claims to a fund that owners forfeit when they convert (prototypical version); or 
(2) claims to a penalty that converting owners pay to owners remaining in agriculture 
(alternate version).
3 
                                                 
2 Several impacts on remaining farmers arise from conversion.  First, conversion brings residents into agricultural 
areas so that remaining farmers likely operate below their most intensive, profitable level to prevent agricultural 
nuisance lawsuits.  Second, these changes are capitalized as a lower value for remaining lands in agriculture land 
use, which in turn raises the incentive to convert.  The impact of conversion also may lower or raise the value of 
land in developed use, depending on several factors in the land market.  The authors contend it is likely that the 
value of agricultural land in developed use rises as neighbors convert.  Hence, the incentive to convert increases 
further. 
3 Michael McGrath, a planner with the State of Delaware, first sketched the alternate version of this technique in the 
following scenario.  Assume 10 farmers agree to the land preservation tontine contract and assume that there is no  
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Duke and Lynch (2006) offered an original development of the prototypical version after they 
were unable to find a written source that describes the use of tontines for agricultural land 
preservation.  This paper evaluates the prototypical version.  Tontines address the external 
effects that neighboring agricultural landowners have on one another rather than acting as a 
method of providing the amenities and environmental benefits (public goods) from farmland 
preservation.  They could be used alone or in conjunction with other preservation techniques. 
  The land preservation tontine provides an increasingly powerful incentive because, as 
more of their neighbors convert, the pool of remaining owners shrinks and their payouts rise with 
the last owner of agricultural land “winning” the entire fund.  Tontines are essentially contracts 
among owners rather than an interaction between landowners and governments.  The conversion 
decision of any one agricultural landowner in productive areas affects the viability of his or her 
neighbors’ operation—even though that landowner has the right to convert.  In this sense, 
tontines are designed to achieve a key preservation goal of avoiding the fragmentation, and 
maintaining a critical mass, of agriculture land. 
 
Agricultural Conservation Pension 
 Since  many  agricultural  landowners say the equity in their land is their retirement fund 
(Lapping 1979), one assumes that, if their retirement could be financed another way, then the 
owners would not need to sell for development when they retire.  The pension plan concept 
guarantees retirement income to farmers who attach an easement to their land as well as other 
benefits.  The guaranteed income attenuates the risks owners face if their accumulated savings is 
                                                                                                                                                             
initial capital.  If one owner sells to a nonfarmer or gets a subdivision plan approved, then the remaining nine share 




too low to retire merely on the proceeds of selling their land for its agricultural value rather than 
its development or market value.  In addition, the expected value of the pension may be higher 
than the expected returns to selling land.  States are better positioned to insure against cyclical 
savings risks than individual farmers because they can pool risks over the population of farmers 
and/or state employees.  This technique also benefits the taxpayers by spreading the financial 
burdens of PACE over a long period of time. 
  Duke and Lynch (2006) classified this technique as a hybrid of an incentive-based 
technique (pension incentive) and a participatory technique (government participation in the 
market for less-than-fee-simple rights in land).  Two general versions are the pension tied to the 
land as an annuity and the pension tied to the owner.   
  In the annuity version, described by McGrath (see footnote 3), a pension runs with the 
land rather than a specific owner.  If one farms for X years in the program, the pension runs for 
X years.  In the owner version, the payments would be tied to an individual/couple and act as a 
pension from a retirement age (say, 65 years) until the person’s death.  This version takes 
advantage of the risk-pooling benefits of the state.  In both versions, the easement restriction is 
permanent. 
  Alternatively, the program could be designed as a reverse mortgage, which converts the 
value of the conservation easement into cash to live on during retirement.  In this case, the owner 
could extract a percentage of the land value each year to finance living expenses.  The 
government could ensure that these payments will continue for the life of the owner and/or 
spouse in exchange for an easement or outright sale of the land.  When the owners die, the estate 
would be settled so that the land is sold for farming purposes and the following owner would not 
be eligible to participate in the pension plan.  During the interviews, the respondents were  
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initially presented with the “owner” version, but many variations arose in the discussions.  As 
such, the comments presented below were more exploratory than a definitive reaction to a single 
version of the technique. 
 
Data 
  Data for this study were collected using interviews of various stakeholders and decision 
makers.  In-depth individual or small-group interviews were conducted with four landowners, 
four lawmakers, and six administrators.  Of these, nine were male and five were female.  Sample 
statistics are presented in Table 2. 
  The same instrument (script of questions) was used in each interview, although the 
emphasis on specific items in the instrument varied in response to the dynamics of the interview 
process.  Program administrator and landowner interviews began with several baseline questions 
about preservation preferences: (1) What should the agricultural landscape look like?; (2) How 
much agricultural land is needed?; and (3) What should the goals of farmland preservation be? 
  Then, the enumerator would describe a technique in disinterested terms and a series of 
questions would guide discussion of that technique: 
1.  Do any aspects of program X appeal to you? 
2.  Do you find any aspects of program X to be not appealing (or objectionable)? 
Landowners were asked these additional questions: 
1.  Would you consider participating in program X? 
2.  Do you think your neighbors would consider participating in program X? 
3.  What would participation hinge upon? 
Administrators were asked these additional questions:  
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1.  What aspect of X is easy (or hard) to administer? 
2.  What aspect of X is easy (or hard) to fund? 
3.  What is your perspective on constituents’ support or opposition to this program? 
Lawmakers were asked one additional question: 
1.  What is your perspective on constituents’ support or opposition to this program? 
Interviews with all three groups concluded with a question asking for a specific comparison 
about which technique is the most attractive.  Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two 
hours.  Each session was tape recorded and then transcribed. 
 
Results 
  All three stakeholder groups thought ROFR was most appealing in terms of both cost and 
acceptability.  Although significant implementation hurdles were noted, the interviewees had the 
ideas and motivation for overcoming these challenges.  In contrast, no group found term 
conservation easements appealing and many respondents found the temporary nature of the 
program to be a fatal flaw. 
  Most respondents viewed the land preservation tontine technique as interesting but too 
unusual to be acceptable, and they noted significant implementation challenges.  Tontines were 
described only in general terms and, not surprisingly, many respondents had trouble 
understanding the concept.  This result is similar to Zollinger and Kranich’s (2001) finding that 
PACE programs were generally unpopular and were only acceptable to those landowners who 
were already familiar with them.  Almost all respondents found the agricultural conservation 
pension to be an attractive technique.  Like tontines, however, most wanted further details to 
determine how acceptable and cost-effective it would be in practice.  The main concerns  
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involved the formula for turning land value into pension payments and the method for 
compensating the successors in interest (to the land) or survivors (of the owner).  For both 
tontines and the pension plan, the technique could be redesigned to be more specific and then 
further research may be warranted. 
  
General Perceptions about Preservation
4 
  Collectively, administrators express a broad, yet nuanced, vision for the agricultural 
landscape (Table 3).  Landowners, in contrast, were more interested in the details of land use 
planning and the state land preservation process.  While landowners expressed preferences for 
some landscape attributes, they did not articulate specific preservation goals.  Administrators 
offered many goals for farmland preservation, classified here as agricultural, orderly 
development, and other goals.  The administrators lack agreement on the importance of aesthetic 
and open space services.  Balancing these competing goals was a challenge noted by Pfeffer and 
Lapping (1994) in their survey of planners. 
  Both landowners and administrators supported using preservation to perpetuate a 
historically agrarian landscape while allowing agricultural uses to evolve over time.  Landowners 
expressed frustration with the state using eminent domain powers for roads.  The importance of 
eminent domain to these landowners reinforces Beesley’s (1999) concern that the effectiveness 
of a technique will be affected not only by the incentive structure of the technique, but also by 
external conditions affecting the agricultural region and other public policies.  Landowners were 
especially concerned about changes currently occurring in agricultural areas and the recent 
escalation in land prices for development. 
  Following the discussion of general views about farmland preservation, the three groups 
                                                 
4 This set of questions was asked only of the landowners and program administrators.  
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were asked the scripted questions about the four techniques.  The following subsections 
synthesize each group’s thoughts about the techniques.  In addition, Tables 4-6 contain the 
specific comments made by administrators, lawmakers, and landowners, respectively.  The rows 
in these tables represent the interview questions outlined in the data section, while columns refer 
to techniques.  Comments in each cell are further organized in terms of three main challenges 
associated with preservation techniques identified in Duke and Lynch (2006): (1) cost, i.e., 
whether the technique is perceived to be more or less cost-effective; (2) acceptability, i.e., to 
landowners and other interested parties; (3) timing, i.e., in terms of both enrollment, 
permanency, etc.; and (4) other relevant comments about acceptability. 
 
Rights of First Refusal 
  ROFR held appeal for this sample of administrators, lawmakers, and landowners.  
Administrators were enthusiastic about the cost effectiveness of ROFR and the possibility of 
targeting (i.e., prioritizing) important agricultural areas.  Yet, this group expressed concerns 
about obtaining dedicated funds for this program and the potential for abuse by owners and 
developers.  Most administrators agreed that a successful ROFR program would need to 
prioritize parcels at the outset.  Targeting is a complex challenge; Pfeffer and Lapping (1994) 
argue that preservation as a growth management tool can be affected by market forces, which 
makes it difficult to target agricultural acres deemed most desirable.  Furthermore, Kline and 
Alig’s (1999) empirical analysis shows that it is unclear how effective land-use planning is in 
preventing development in exclusive agricultural areas.  Other implementation challenges would 
include monitoring land sales, enforcing contracts, and managing land bought fee simple.  
However, the administrators had thoughts on how best to address these challenges.  The  
  15
implementation challenges are best addressed when the highest levels of government coordinate 
planning across local governments (Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2002). 
  Lawmakers also found the ROFR technique to be appealing.  Like administrators, 
lawmakers suggested that prioritization was important and could possibly be achieved through 
existing, high-level plans such as Livable Delaware.  They also stressed the need for dedicated 
funding to avoid a “cash crunch” when a parcel became available.  Landowners had more 
reservations but valued the voluntary nature of ROFR. 
 
Term Conservation Easements 
  Term conservation easements found little favor from administrators, lawmakers, and 
landowners.  Most respondents viewed negatively the temporary attribute of term easements 
relative to the permanence of PACE.  Although some respondents identified important benefits 
of the technique—such as attracting new participants—most respondents viewed the temporary 
nature of term easements to be a fatal flaw.  This flaw likely explains most of the respondents’ 
disapproval and contrasts with previous results on support for the similar, but permanent, PACE 
technique; Pfeffer and Lapping (1995) report that planners thought 45 percent of farmers would 
support PACE.  Few respondents thought new funding for the term conservation easements 
could be obtained. 
  Administrators did not support this technique, although they acknowledged certain 
benefits.  Specifically, term easements might enroll a large number of acres at a low cost, thus 
buying time to employ alternate preservation techniques, and might attract new participants who 
are wary of long-term commitments.  Nonetheless, administrators perceive this technique to 
provide merely temporary benefits with the same or even higher administrative costs than PACE  
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because of anticipated higher levels of monitoring and enforcement.  Overall, term easements 
would have questionable cost effectiveness and, for this reason, would be tough to sell to 
lawmakers and the general public.  The administrators lacked consensus about whether the 
technique would actually be less expensive—when all costs are considered—than PACE. 
  Lawmakers did not see term easements as the best option when considering new 
techniques.  Perhaps the most open-minded group with respect to this technique, lawmakers 
wanted additional information on possible landowner participation.  One lawmaker rejected the 
technique out of hand because of its temporary duration.   
  Landowners were very skeptical about term easements and the government’s ability to 
administer the program fairly.  They believed that term easements would not provide the benefits 
of permanency they want as landowners.  This result ran counter to Duke and Lynch’s (2006) 
hypothesis that landowners would support them.  One would have expected that landowners 
would be the primary supporters of term easements given the greater flexibility.  It also contrasts 
with Zollinger and Krannich’s (2001) result that Utah landowners preferred tax relief programs 
even though they did not guarantee permanent preservation. 
 
Land Preservation Tontines 
  Administrators, lawmakers, and landowners did not find the land preservation tontine 
concept to be a viable technique.  Many respondents expressed a general level of interest, 
especially administrators.  Overall, however, the concept seemed too “bizarre” and many 
implementation problems were noted.  Since the respondents had trouble understanding the 
concept, a redesign for clarity and a follow-up investigation may generate more useful policy 
information.  
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  Administrators were most interested in the incentive structure and the private, collective 
quality of the technique.  However, they had many qualms.  For example, administrators noted 
significant implementation challenges—perhaps the most of any of the four techniques—which 
is somewhat surprising since the land preservation tontine is a “private” solution.  Many noted 
practical problems, such as explaining the concept, attracting participants, and preventing abuse.  
Understanding the concept seemed to be the main hurdle to funding and encouraging 
participation.  Several noted that a refinement could be more workable, ranging from a simple 
name change to more significant modifications like eliminating the government role and 
explicitly modeling the concept as a cooperative.   
  Neither lawmakers nor landowners found land preservation tontines to be an attractive 
concept.  Several expressed an interest in the technique and the incentives created, but most were 
too unsure of the concept to offer definitive opinions.  One lawmaker found the technique to be 
“bizarre.”  Landowners argued that regular cash payments would be essential to any preservation 
effort.  It is somewhat surprising that landowners did not support tontines because, in theory, 
tontines may be best at preventing conflicts with nonfarming neighbors.  This reinforces Pfeffer 
and Lapping’s (1994) mixed results on whether planners thought farmers would be more 
supportive of preservation techniques in the presence of these types of conflicts. 
 
Agricultural Conservation Pension 
  Almost all respondents found the agricultural conservation pension to be an appealing 
concept.  Yet, all wanted more details on how the concept would be implemented, and many 
respondents offered suggestions on the design.  The main concerns involved the formula for 
turning land value into pension payments and the way successors in interest (to the land) or  
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survivors (of the owner) would be compensated.  Most suggested that this concept holds greater 
appeal for younger owners.  Further specification and research on stakeholder support is needed 
before possible implementation. 
  Administrators found this concept to be very appealing and interesting.  In particular, 
they felt it directly addressed a common reason owners give for conversion—the need to finance 
retirement—which provides additional empirical support for this claim made in Lapping’s 
(1979).  Because the concept was described in general terms, most of the administrators’ 
concerns involved the specific manner in which the technique would be designed.  
Administrators offered many suggestions on how it could be designed and the challenges 
overcome. 
  Lawmakers also were attracted to the concept, but suggested that a single version of plan 
needed to be described in greater detail.  It was suggested that legislative staffs could further 
flesh out the details of such a plan.  Similarly, landowners thought the concept offered an 
attractive option, but wanted more details. 
 
Final Ranking of the Techniques 
  At the end of the interviews, the participants were asked to make final comparisons 
and/or rank the proposed techniques based upon the discussion.  Most administrators were 
willing to make comparative comments.  ROFR ranked the highest among administrators.  One 
noted that it is a potentially high-benefit technique but without sufficient and secure funding it 
could not be successful.  Another administrator ranked it first, but with the caveats that it 
depends on the quality of the contract instrument and careful targeting.  A third administrator, 
who liked all of the techniques, noted that ROFR was especially promising, but also that it might  
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be politically “sensitive” to introduce because it creates explicit winners and losers.  Pension 
plans were deemed the second most promising technique.  One administrator suggested that 
pension plans are high-benefit, but low-feasibility.  Term easements and tontines were ranked 
lowest by administrators.  Several noted that term easements would be unpopular because of the 
impermanent nature, although one suggested that it would be the best from the farmers’ points of 
view.  Tontines were perceived by most administrators to be an interesting concept, but with low 
feasibility.  One administrator suggested that tontines might become workable if set up explicitly 
as cooperatives without government funding.  Another administrator expressed skepticism at the 
need for new techniques, arguing that higher budgets and secure, dedicated funds for existing 
techniques are more important. 
  The lawmakers also ranked ROFR as the top choice.  It was noted that ROFR should be 
given a new, less-intimidating name.  Term easements’ rankings were mixed, with lawmakers 
expressing both strong positive and strong negative opinions.  One lawmaker said that this 
technique would “go over well,” but other lawmakers believed that the impermanent nature of 
the technique would raise many objections.  The pension plan technique rankings were also 
mixed, tying for second place among some lawmakers, while others wanted more information 
before ranking.  At minimum, all lawmakers thought the technique was worth exploring.  
Lawmakers ranked tontines the lowest, arguing either that the technique was insufficiently clear 
and undeveloped or that its potential for implementation and success was the lowest. 
  Landowners preferred pension plans and ROFR.  Nothing specific was noted in the 
concluding questions about term easements or tontines.  Landowners liked the voluntary nature 
of participation in ROFR.  They also thought that competition in the development land market 
would lead farmers to get the highest possible return for their land.  Landowners indicated they  
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would rank ROFR lower if it were mandatory.  Overall, the landowners said that education is 
important with any new program, noting that they thought they learned about PACE too late.  
Zollinger and Krannich (2001) came to a similar conclusion that an information campaign could 
increase the acceptability of PACE.  Most information about land preservation came via word of 
mouth from neighbors rather than from the programs themselves. 
 
Conclusions 
  The general public continues to express concern about disappearing farmland and 
supports on going farmland preservation.  Concern exists, however, that the current techniques 
are not sufficient to retain farmland either due to limited funding or inadequacies in their design 
and operation.  While there have been many studies looking at what the general public desires 
from preserved farmland, there have been relatively few asking policy makers, administrators, 
and landowners what types of techniques they think would be acceptable and effective.  This 
paper describes four innovative farmland preservation techniques and then investigates their 
acceptance with these three stakeholder groups.  These four techniques were chosen from a list 
of 29 farmland preservation techniques—representing three of the four types of preservation 
techniques—and were chosen as ones that may overcome some limitations of current techniques. 
Following interviews with representatives of these stakeholder groups, this study argues 
that ROFR is deemed the most acceptable of the four options.  Respondents found that its 
permanence, voluntary nature (although it could be mandatory), cost-effectiveness, and 
familiarity were positive attributes.  There was some disagreement as to its cost-effectiveness: it 
could be costly to secure the rights and the permanency benefits do not accrue for many years to 
come and/or the state must purchase the land at its full market value rather than for lesser rights.   
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Overall, though, respondents thought with prioritization schemes this technique could help 
achieve farmland preservation goals.   
  While stakeholder groups believed flexibility to be a desirable attribute, they did not like 
term conservation easements due to their temporary nature.  Respondents seemed to perceive that 
term easements simply give money to landowners in return for nothing, and that they had the 
potential to undercut existing PACE programs.  Both the agricultural preservation tontine and 
agricultural preservation pension plan were thought to be worth exploring, but more details 
would be needed before respondents could fully evaluate their acceptability and cost-
effectiveness. 
  Investigations like this highlight some of the attributes of policies that are appealing and 
unappealing and could lead to further technique development.  Clearly, administrators have well-
formed opinions on the issues, though they do not always agree.  Further interviews with this 
stakeholder group would be desirable after more development of the agricultural preservation 
tontine and pension programs.  Lawmakers held some strong opinions on the acceptability and 
feasibility of new techniques—and they also did not always agree—but this group also tended to 
be open minded about learning more about new options and their constituents’ opinions of these 
options.  Lawmakers did tend to favor techniques that were most familiar and simple.  Interviews 
with this group provided a useful reality check on whether the techniques were too complicated 
to be politically feasible. 
  Interviews with the landowners produced less useful information on the broader version 
of the techniques.  Landowners may need more specific program proposals on which to respond 
to elicit additional information.  They also were more focused on their specific circumstances 
and how the new technique might apply to them.    
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Table 1 
Evaluation of Farmland Preservation Techniques (Relative to the Average Technique) 
Evaluation Criteria  Explanation  Term Easements  Land 
Preservation 
Tontine 





Property Rights Issues         
Right Holder  Implied holder of rights to develop Landowner  Landowner Landowner  Landowner 
Duration  How long is the retention supposed to last? Temporary Temporary Permanent Permanent 
Credibility of Persistence  How easy is it to redefine rights, say, through variances?  Persistent  Persistent Persistent  Persistent 
Satisfaction of the 
Goals of Farmland 
Preservation 
       
Acres Enrolled  Average  More effectively  Less effectively  Much more 
effectively 




Productive Farms  Average  More effectively  More effectively  Average  
Critical Mass 
How does the technique promote one goal relative to 
other techniques? 
More effectively  Much more 
effectively 
More effectively  Average  
Financing         
Financing Source 













Stakeholder Acceptance         
Agricultural Landowner  Very high  Somewhat high  Average   High 
General Public  Somewhat high  Somewhat high  Somewhat high   Somewhat 
high 
Environmentalists  Very low  Somewhat high  Somewhat low  Average 
Developers 
How likely is the technique to be accepted relative to the 
other techniques? 





How challenging is it to implement the technique 
relative to the other techniques? 
Easier Low  Easier  Average 
Attract  Nonparticipants         
Attract  Does the program have an ability to attract (or force) 
participation from those not participating in existing 
farmland preservation efforts? 
Some ability   Some ability   Unusual ability   Unusual 
ability  
Source: Adapted from Duke and Lynch (2006). 
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Table 2 
Summary of Interviews Conducted in Delaware (11) and Maryland (3) 
 
Interviewees Participants Gender 
Landowners 
  4 2M,  2F 




Nonprofit Program Administrator/Official 
  1 F 
Lawmakers (one group and one individual interview) 
  4 2M,  2F 




Table 3: General Views on Land Preservation 
 Program  Administrators  Landowners 
What Should the 




  Viable agricultural economy 
  Agricultural productivity/protection of best soils 
  Agricultural, not an open space, focus  
  Avoid impermanence syndrome 
  Need for critical mass 
  An adequate agricultural land base 
  Improve farm practices and water quality 
Orderly Development Goals: 
  Stop development from gaining momentum 
  Not spreading cluster development in countryside 
Other Goals: 
  Protecting sensitive ecological areas 
  Scenic and open space values 
  Cultural and historic values 
  Preserve as much land as possible 
 
Landowners had no specific vision for program goals 
because they have concerns (distrust) about state 
and local governments’ ability to solve land 
problems – however they can picture the 
landscape they would like (see below) 
Appreciate ability to pass on land to family 
Concerned about rapidly escalating value of land – help 
keep farmland affordable 
 
 
What Should the 
Landscape Look Like? 
 
Historic agricultural landscape with working farms 
Agricultural use that evolves over time  
Aesthetics should be an “outcome, not an objective” 
Alright to mix agriculture with other uses sometimes 
 
Open space 
Historical agrarian landscape attributes 
Natural wooded settings  
Concentrate development and avoid rural sprawl 
 
How Much 
Agricultural Land is 
Needed? 
 
Triple the acreage preserved  
Can vary given other goals 
Uncertain—number of acres is a moving target 
Enough to support infrastructure of agricultural input 
sector 
Enough so the area looks agricultural 
 
Enough to avoid condemnation for roads 
Agriculture cannot compete with development in the 
price of land—difficult to keep in agriculture  
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Table 4: Program Administrator Responses 





Preserve more acres in short term* 
Prevent impermanence syndrome 
Acceptability 
Might be more acceptable to some 
owners than PACE and Ag districts 
Timing 
Might buy time until more effective 
regulations or land-use planning 
can be implemented* 
Quicker agreements with landowners 
Heads off problems in development hot 
spots 
Other 
An ongoing payment/relationship may 
produce more contact and thus 




Increased trust among neighbors would 
reduce monitoring costs  
Progressively increasing incentive to remain 
in farming 
No downside for owners if state financed 
A collective way to manage risk—at a lower 
cost 
Acceptability 
A private solution—no governmental role 
Would appeal to owners who distrust 
government 
Creates a formal incentive to stay in 
agriculture—everyone wants to be the 
surviving owner  
A grassroots solution—farmers want to 
ensure that their area remains in farming 
Timing 
May help bind farmers to a course of action 
when the farm is owned by many 
owners (say siblings or cousins) 
Chain reactions: developers leave; farmers 
invest 
Cost 
Should be inexpensive if owners are 
comfortable with government 
Acceptability 
Should be some interest among certain 
types of farmers 
Offers flexibility 
Timing 
Targets parcels truly threatened so timing 
right 
Other 
Could be designed to target certain areas 
in the state requiring intervention 
Gives policy makers a high degree of 
control 
Can target key parcels 
Appealing if integrated into the use-value 
assessment program (like NJ)—also 
may stop developers from taking 
advantage of use-value assessment 
Cost 
Pooling of risks provides advantages* 
Acceptability 
Generate new participants—many avoid 
PACE because “my land is my 
pension” 
Deals directly with an important, 
frequently cited incentive to 
convert—retirement* 
Could this plan correctly counteract the 
conversion incentive and satisfy 
owners? 
Timing 
Leverages dollars as PACE payments paid 
over a long period of time 




Paying people to be farmers with a 
pension 




“A glorified transfer payment of public 
funds to farmers” 
Questionable cost effectiveness—much 
of enrolled land would not be 
developed, so what benefit is 
secured? 
Acceptability 
May undercut perceived attractiveness 
of existing permanent programs 
May attract the wrong type of 
participants, like developers 





Potential for bad incentives, including 
corruption 
Acceptability 
“Strange” and “weird”*  and so unusual 
Do not call it “tontine” 
“I just don’t see how it could work” 
Landowners will have trouble understanding 
this and wouldn’t risk participating 
Why not just create a farmer’s cooperative? 
Timing 
Will the incentive really stop the farmer 
who has a life event? 
Other 
Difficult to understand—do not see what 
government’s role will be* 
Cost 
Difficult to get the rights voluntarily 
May require a lot of money up front, with 
little immediate returns on what that 
money was spent for 
Inflate cost of purchasing land/rights 
“Large” offer may be contingent on a 
subdivision, which has little chance 
of being approved 
Unlike PACE, which preserves now at 
low cost, ROFR waits and could be 
very high cost 
Timing 
Farmers and developers will figure out 
which parcels are enrolled on their 
own, through word of mouth 
Cost 
Annuity has to be large enough to “get 
people’s attention” 
Acceptability 
Health insurance is more important 
Might not leave enough money in the land 
for heirs in large families 
Timing 
More attractive to young farmers 
                                                 
5 “*” indicates at least two people made this comment.  
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Landowners enroll while they wait to 
develop—join once but not re-
enroll 
“Going in the wrong direction” because 
the durability of permanent 
easements is increasingly being 
challenged 
Other 
Not clear what is being purchased 
Not adaptable to future circumstances 
If funded publicly, could farmers collude to 
undercut the incentives 
May create animosity among neighbors 
How could the pot provide a large enough 
incentive to override the incentive to 
convert?  
Uncertain how this will affect 
speculation 
Other 
Opportunities for fraud.  State is going to 
be taken advantage of developers and 
owners will abuse/manipulate the 






High monitoring and enforcement 
costs—even more than permanent 
easements* 
More staff time than the permanent 
program 
Need dedicated source of funding 
Participants need assurances that 
money will be there each year in 
the future  
May be cheaper to purchase permanent 
easements* 
Acceptability 
IRS passed regulations requiring that 
easements be perpetual to be tax 
deductible 
Timing 
Difficult to negotiate a yearly payment 
10 or 20 years into the future—how 
do you account for land market 
changes and inflation? 
Other 
Difficult unless the agency has an 
existing permanent program with 
the accompanying infrastructure 
Some participants will want to break 
the agreement; should the contract 
be “iron clad” or should there be a 
penalty for leaving? 
A rollback penalty would counter some 
undesired incentives from 
landowners—i.e., enroll, then leave 




Must figure out the state’s role in 
enforcement to avoid litigation every 
time a farm is sold 
Need a significant amount of state funding 
to get landowners interested—say, 
dividends 
Where will the money come from? 
A lot of administration effort in getting 
groups to agree 
Managing the money may be easy, but not 
managing the participants if behavior 
degenerates 
Higher management costs than PACE 
Acceptability 
How to articulate, clearly, how this tool 
works?* 
Difficult to generate participation, motivate 
the formation of tontines, and educate 
Unsure if people would participate; perhaps, 
try a pilot project to understand the 
challenges 
Clarity of acceptable activities essential 
Uncertainty—“How big does the pot have to 
be to affect the decision making of 
farmers?” 
Need more work on the incentives—think 
hard about the possibility for side deals, 
and how to deal with these 
May be a “bias” in the legislatures against 
innovation—what we do is working, so 
why try something new? 
Timing 
Challenges in the state’s role: how to make 
the process timely? 
Cost 
Requires additional staff—more effort 
than PACE, although some disagree 
Needs a database to monitor when farms 
is sold—need for monitoring 
mechanism * 
State could hold purchased properties 
over time, but with more 
management expenses 
Large funding required at uncertain 
times*; need an “Emergency Land 
Protection Fund”  
Needs funding up front to attract owners 
Use seed money to begin purchases, then 
account rises with land sales and falls 
with purchases 
Unlikely to have a large endowment that 
the state promises not to touch 
Acceptability 
Not all agencies can own land fee simple 
Ownership may be a burden on the state 
Easier to get funding if a well-developed 
targeting plan exists 
Any targeting plan will upset some folks 
if they are not in the targeted area 
Increase familiarity—perhaps start by 
having the farm community ask for 
ROFR with their leases 
Timing 
May take time to figure out what land is 
really worth 
Other 
Difficult to write law, write contracts, 
and defend it in litigation 
May get very complicated in rules for 
Cost 
Complicated for PACE staff, but may rely 
on other groups in government that 
handle pensions 
Because the payment is made over time, 
PACE staff may be familiar with this sort 
of financial arrangement 
Acceptability 
Sell to the legislature as another way to 
get development rights 
Consider whether this is a way to avoid 
the estate tax? 
Timing 
Implement for people who are younger 
Other 
Difficult to determine a value—normal 
pensions are based on salary, but this 
one is different and more complicated 
Create a formula (instead of salary and 
years of service into pension) where 
farm value is analogous to salary 
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Lawyers need to figure out how to write the 
contracts 
Legislatures need to create enabling statutes 
Figure out how a pot of money will adjust 
over time to reflect inflation and land-
market conditions 
Might be able to combine with other tools 
resale 
State preservation is well-positioned to 
do this, depending on the volume 
Need to prevent fraud: if board does not 
act on its ROFR, then severe 
penalties if developer does not buy 
Publish the list of targeted farms so 
developers believe the state will 
credibly match offers 
Develop a contract-enforcement plan 
In targeting, the state needs to be 
thoughtful in deciding where they 





Tough to fund (sell to lawmakers)—a 
cost for a nonpermanent benefit* 
Could be seen as throwing money away 
Acceptability 
Talbot County, MD, tried this and 
failed because state-level 
politicians did not like the 
temporary nature 
Easier to sell if it were linked to a target 
group, like new farmers 
Public has to learn about the technique 
and be convinced that this is good 
policy 
Public already buys into PACE—a new 
term easement program may cause 
confusion or skepticism 
Landowners will be attracted to the 
temporary attribute—more flexible 
Landowners should like it because 
benefits are more tangible than 
Agricultural Preservation Districts 
Timing 
Easier to sell as a solution inside a 
growth zone with PACE outside the 
zone 
Others 
Viewed as a poor-quality technique: 
“Do not like investing the time and 
effort into anything that is less than 
perpetual” 
Cost 
Taxpayers won’t fund it because it is too 
“weird” 
Acceptability 




Farming community will not accept it if 
it is perceived to be a new regulation 
(i.e., is coercive)* 
May feel “creepy” to landowners if 
coerced or as a requirement for 
participation in another program 
Passionate agricultural landowners may 
participate, but others may not 
without a strong incentive 
Others 
If the state exercised ROFR on every 
property in a targeted area, then 
developers would stop bringing 
offers to these farmers—this could 
alienate developers and drive up the 
costs of the contracts 
 
Acceptability 
Varying views on attractiveness to 
farmers and whether it will generate 
interest  
Most farmers are already comfortable 
participating in government programs, 
so they probably will not object to the 
arrangement with the state 
Nonfarmers may object, saying how come 
we don’t get a pension? 
Version with a low monthly payout and a 
bigger death payout would probably 
sell better 
Better for farmers who don’t need cash for 
their agricultural operations 
Others 
Determine whether farmers who sell were 
just making “excuses” when they 
claimed retirement is the reason 
farmers would like the security* 
Amish or Mennonite farmers may not 




Table 5: Lawmaker Responses 
  Term Easements  Agricultural Preservation Tontine  Rights of First Refusal  Agricultural Preservation Pension 
with PACE 
Appealing  Timing 
May slow the progression of 
sprawl development 
Acceptability 
Help where the permanent 
program has been less 
successful 
Cost 
An incentive to preserve for the last 
party 
Lower Cost 
Less expensive because state could 
pay price of the first offer 
rather than after the property 
has been “flipped” several 
times 
Acceptability 
An “appealing” concept 
Does not “penalize” the farmer 
Familiar tool as it is used privately 
Acceptability 
 “Great concept on paper” 
Security in the farming community 
Other 
Helps address problems when an 







Not sure this would be the best 
use of money 
Timing 




“It’s kind of bizarre” 
Need to consider further before 
giving an opinion 
Cost 
Risk of “cash crunch” 
Timing 
State does not act fast enough if a 
farmer pressed for time  
State may not be able to come up 
with enough money quickly 
Cost 
Tough sell to get funded—seems 






How can the state compete with 
developers as land values 
rise so rapidly? 
Other 
Complicated equity—participants 
having different acreages with 
different values and different-
aged owners 
Cost 
Need dedicated revenue stream to 
support it 
Must select priority areas to target* 
Acceptability 
Difficult to prioritize 
 
Cost 
Difficult to fund  
Acceptability 
Small business owners may get 
option to participate in state 
health insurance 
Lawyers and legislative research 






Likely that landowners would 
want to participate, but 
need evidence 
May help address declining 
interest in PACE 
Acceptability 
Not sure how this technique would 
“go over” 
Nonfarmers will not feel strongly 
Cost 
Nonfarming community may 
object to the expenditures 
Acceptability 
Concept implies changing titles, 
which would intimidate 
farmers 
Constituents may favor some 




No opposition from any group to 
this plan 
Farmers need to be educated about 
the program 
Would be of interest  
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Table 6: Landowner Responses 
  Term Easements  Agricultural Preservation 
Tontine 
Rights of First Refusal  Agricultural Preservation 
Pension with PACE 
Appealing No  positive  comments  Acceptability 
Need a cash payment to be 
appealing 
No incentive without a 
payment—the pot of 
money is not sufficient  
Cost 
Full compensation for land 
value 
Acceptability 




More appealing to younger 
farmers  
Would overcome incentive to 
sell land for retirement 
Depends on the tax 
implication of taking 
pension payments or a 







will simply sell their 
land after lease term 
Skeptical that there will be 
too many loopholes 
that allow people to 
opt-out* 
Acceptability 
Will not be funded well 
enough to be 
appealing 
Distrust government with 
implementing this 
technique due to its 
use of eminent domain 
A rollback penalty would 
not be fair 
Acceptability 
 “Not confusing to me, but it’s 
just not attractive” 
Difficult to reconcile 
ownership with interest in 
this pot of money 
You could not use this interest 
as collateral at a bank 
Timing 
Might only appeal to the 
youngest farmers 
Acceptability 
Concept was confused with 
eminent domain for 
roads and with TDR 




Figure out how to increase 
pension over time to 
keep up with 
appreciation in the land 
market 
Appraisal needs to be 
unbiased 
Acceptability 
Cash upfront is more flexible 
Other 
Contingencies for accidents:  
Guaranteed payment and/or 
benefits go to survivors? 
 